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ABSTRACT 
Neural networks are now actively being used for 
computer vision tasks in security critical areas such as 
robotics, face recognition, autonomous vehicles yet their 
safety is under question after the discovery of adversarial 
attacks. 
In this paper we develop simplified adversarial attack 
algorithms based on a scoping idea, which enables 
execution of fast adversarial attacks that minimize 
structural image quality (SSIM) loss, allows performing 
efficient transfer attacks with low target inference network 
call count and opens a possibility of an attack using pen-
only drawings on a paper for the MNIST handwritten digit 
dataset. 
The presented adversarial attack analysis and the idea 
of attack scoping can be easily expanded to different 
datasets, thus making the paper’s results applicable to a 
wide range of practical tasks. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Year of 2012 has seen a paradigm shift from human-
generated feature extractors for computer vision 
applications, in particular image classification, to self-
learnt classification systems named Neural Networks, 
when AlexNet won ImageNet Large Scale Visual 
Recognition Challenge with an error rate significantly 
lower than that of competing solutions. Neural networks 
are being learnt by feeding large amounts of data and 
changing its inner representation to lower error using Back 
Propagation algorithm. That way, researchers have 
attempted to copy the way a child is being learnt. Yet one 
piece is missing – a way of interrogating and validating 
what exactly the network has learnt. The initial attempts in 
that direction have been made by looking at statistical 
distributions [2], finding network components sensitive to 
a specific feature [3] or generating an image causing a 
maximum activation of a specific network unit [4]. 
However, we still have no full understanding of the neural 
network inference process. 
The ongoing research in a direction of neural network 
inference understanding has led to a discovery coined as 
Adversarial Attack [3]. By adding a slight human-
imperceptible perturbation to an input image, it has been 
made possible to fool the network and force it to 
misclassify the image as an instance of another class. Such 
an attack has been further divided into 2 subgroups: 1) the 
non-targeted attack, when the new inference class is of no 
importance unless it’s different from the source; 2) the 
targeted attack, when we specify the target class we want 
the network to predict after the attack for a given image. 
In this work we: 1) provide an insight into the attack 
procedure; 2) develop a new set of fast targeted and non-
targeted algorithms that minimize structural image quality 
loss; 3) compare the algorithms against the ones previously 
developed and explore new attack applications by utilizing 
our algorithm’s features. 
 
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
While neural networks are considered to be an efficient 
solution to many problems including, but not limited to 
object detection in images, speech recognition, natural 
language processing, their inner workings are not entirely 
understood. One of the first attempts to better understand 
the neural network inference apparatus for image 
classification [3] has led to an interesting neural networks 
property called by the authors “Adversarial attack”. The 
idea was to investigate how input modification affects 
neural network’s output. As it has been discovered, a slight 
change to the input is enough for the neural network to 
misclassify the image. However, it is highly unlikely to 
achieve such an effect via random search over input 
modifications, the change must be directed. The first 
algorithm performing such a directed search is Box-
constrained L-BFGS [3]. Later, a faster and simpler 
algorithm FGSM (Fast Gradient Step Method) has been 
developed, where first-order loss function derivative 
approximation has been used to generate adversarial 
examples [6]. The attack is performed in a single step, 
which in practice leads to either overly perturbed images 
or images that are failing to trick the network. I-FGM is an 
iterative method, which performs an attack until it 
succeeds. Another simple enhancement over FGSM is 
made, that is instead of using a sign of gradient of loss 
function, the gradient itself can be used, thus leading to 
more efficient and less noisy adversarial images [7]. 
Another captivating property of adversarial examples is 
their transferability, i.e. image can be generated for one 
network and blindly transferred attack a different network 
with a success. Simple and fast algorithms are still under 
active development, by using gradient with momentum it 
has been possible to improve adversarial image generation 
and improve their transferability to other networks [8]. 
Another group of algorithms is those that are trying to 
generate adversarial images with particular properties. In 
[9] Jacobian-Based Saliency Map algorithm has been 
introduced. By using forward derivative and building 
Jacobian matrix of the function learned by the neural 
network, authors try to find points that will change the 
output of the network the most. By modifying them one at 
a time from the most important to the least, they essentially 
target 𝐿1 quality metric, that is the number of pixels 
modified during the attack. An algorithm that makes it 
possible to generate a universal noise mask once and then 
reapply it to other images to misclassify them is presented 
in [10]. Although this algorithm allows us to generate new 
adversarial images for free without an expensive 
computation, the images generated do not pursue quality 
goals and only non-targeted attack can be performed. 
It has been shown that adversarial attacks can be 
conducted in real-world too. Noisy images printed using 
color printer can make neural network perceiving through 
mobile-phone camera to misclassify images [12]. 
Autonomous vehicles are also vulnerable to attacks as 
noisy stickers can be printed and attached to road signs, 
causing a severe misclassification of “Stop” sign as a 
“Speed Limit”. The attack is robust to distance and viewing 
angle change, thus potentially causing a road accident [11]. 
Face recognition systems are in effect as special googles 
can be developed for the human to be misclassified as 
another person or to evade detection all together [13]. 
An active research in the domain of adversarial attack 
defense and detection is being conducted. An exhaustive 
attack and defense catalog can be found in the works [16, 
17]. Notwithstanding a diligent investment is this area, no 
security measure known to date has survived newer 
generation of adversarial attacks. In [19] it has been shown 
that it is possible to transfer images to secured networks or 
networks with an unknown architecture or trained on an 
unknown dataset (classes of the dataset are still known). In 
[15] authors have developed C&W adversarial attack 
algorithm, that optimizing a special loss function is able to 
generate more robust attack images, which allowed them 
to generate more efficient adversarial examples compared 
to the algorithms known to date and to crack Defensive 
Distillation algorithm. C&W algorithm targets purely 
white-box attack algorithm (transfer to a different network 
is still possible). ZOO algorithm presented in [14] is an 
adaptation of C&W attack for a black-box scenario. 
Though is more effective, it is very slow. Finally, by 
adjusting C&W algorithm loss function, it has been shown 
that it is possible to break 10 more adversarial attack 
detection algorithms [20].  
Many of the above-described adversarial attack and 
defense methods can be found in an opensource collection 
known as cleverhans library [14]. 
An important point for further adversarial attack 
defense research is to better understand the precursors of 
the attack. Thus, an attempt to present an efficient, fast and 
simple algorithm has been made in this paper. The key 
goals are: 1) the algorithm’s attack flow should be easily 
understood and implemented; 2) the algorithm should be 
fast, so that generalized algorithm performance statistics 
could be collected on large arrays of images; 3) the 
algorithm should enable new types of neural network 
attacks. 
 
3 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
3.1 Problem statement 
Let 𝐼 – feature space dimensionality, neuron count in 
the network’s input layer; 𝐾 – number of classes, neuron 
count in the output layer; 𝑥 – network’s input vector, 
image’s pixel brightness vector; 𝑦 – unit vector, which 
defines object attribution to one class or another; 𝑧 – 
network’s output vector. 
Given a training set 
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where 
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, 
𝑀 – training batch size, used to define number of images 
used in a single optimization method step during training; 
𝜎𝑘(⋅) – output layer’s k
th neuron softmax activation 
function, which computes layer output by its input. 
As is known, softmax serves a goal of transforming an 
arbitrary real-valued vector into a probability distribution 
of the inferred classed. Cross-entropy loss 𝛾(𝑊, 𝑏; 𝑧, 𝑦) 
defines an error metric between computed outputs 𝑦 and 
desired 𝑧. 
We denote 𝑆 – source class, 𝑇 – target class (desired 
result), ?̂? – desired (target) neural network’s output. 
1. Find such a perturbation 𝛥𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝐼, which for a given 
value 𝑇 ∈ {1,2, . . . , 𝐾} and deliberately chosen 𝑥, such that  
𝑧𝑆 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1,𝐾
𝑧𝑘,  𝑆 ≠ 𝑇,  
?̂?𝑇 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1,𝐾
?̂?𝑘, 
where ?̂? = 𝜎((𝑥 + 𝛥𝑥) ⋅ 𝑊 + 𝑏). 
2. Find such a perturbation 𝛥𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝐼, which for a 
deliberately chosen 𝑥, such that 𝑧𝑆 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1,𝐾
𝑧𝑘, 
𝑙 ∈  {1,2, . . . , 𝐾} can be found that meets a condition of 
?̂?𝑙 > ?̂?𝑆. 
 
 
3.2 Generating Adversarial Examples 
We consider the MNIST dataset because of its small 
size and ability to make accurate predictions even using 
simple neural networks. The dataset consists of normalized 
grayscale handwritten digit images in range 0 – 9 of size 
28 × 28. The dataset has been split into training subset 
with 60,000 examples and testing subset 10,000. Each 
subset contains samples of digits handwritten by distinct 
people. 
For the neural network training and inference process 
each image is unrolled into single-dimensional vector. 
Pixel intensities are normalized into [0,1] range by 
dividing its values by 255, then 0 stands for black pixels, 1 
for the white ones.  
A single-layer neural network (logistic regression) has 
been chosen as a target network architecture. It is built with 
an input layer of 𝐼 = 784 neurons (each input pixel is 
considered as a separate input feature) and 𝐾 = 10 in the 
output layer (by the number of classes). The logistic 
regression’s key advantage, which will be used further 
down to build an attack algorithm, is interpretability of a 
weight matrix 𝑊𝑖𝑘 as of an importance or a contribution of 
𝑖th image pixel towards 𝑘th class classification. Precisely, if 
𝑊𝑖𝑘 > 0, it is expected that an increase of a corresponding 
pixel brightness by a some 𝛿 >  0 will lead to a higher 
confidence towards classifying an image as an example of 
𝑘th class, for 𝑊𝑖𝑘 < 0 increase in pixel brightness will 
respectively decrease the classification confidence.  
Representation of all MNIST classes in a form of a 
pixel importance map towards classifying each image as an 
instance of ith class is shown on figure 1. The presented 
illustrations can be thought of as some generic neural 
network digit representation and in most cases these 
representations can be recognized as rough shapes of actual 
handwritten digits. 
Figure 1 – Pixel importance map towards classifying each image as an instance of ith class 
 
The result of a subtraction 𝑊𝑖9 −𝑊𝑖4,  ∀𝑖 is shown on 
figure 2. By building such a weight difference we can 
easily see that the most important region for maximizing 
images inference towards the class of nines is below the 
shape of four (shown in light tones). It makes sense as 
bottom line is a piece that must be present in a nice and 
must not be present in a four. Regions that minimize digit’s 
classification probability towards nine lie outside the shape 
of a digit in the top right and left corners and in the middle 
left, likely hinting that nines should have rounded edges 
and fours should not. Such an intuitive pixel importance 
map representation will lie a foundation of the first 
adversarial attack algorithm. 
 
In order to make any conclusions about algorithm’s 
efficiency we need to introduce a quality metric. To 
estimate image quality loss 𝐿∞-norm has been used in [8], 
that is the largest deviation of a pixel brightness over an 
entire image. For images, whose pixel values are bound in 
the range [0,255] deviations up to 15 points were 
permitted. However, such a metric allows to generate 
nearly unrecognizable (when compared to the source) 
images, which is not something we are up to. So, a metric 
that is highly correlated with a human perception is needed. 
The best results can be obtained by using one of the 
following metrics: MAE (Mean Absolute Error), PSNR 
(Peak Signal to Noise Ratio), SSIM (Structural Similarity 
Index). The first two are easy to compute and are 
frequently used, but they do not take human vision features 
into account. SSIM metrics has been introduced as an 
improvement on top of MAE and PSNR. As it has been 
shown in [21], it is possible to craft images with different 
distortions namely adding noise, changing 
brightness/contrast, blurring the image, that will get the 
same MAE score, while the images are vastly different and 
given dissimilar scores by the human observers. SSIM 
score has no such a deficiency and outputs scores that are 
highly correlated with a human vision. SSIM metric values 
lie in range [−1,1]. The maximum value signifies that 
images are identical. PSNR is also a more efficient than 
MAE, but its scores have no upper bound, meaning that for 
identical images we will get an infinite score, thus making 
nearly impossible to generate a consistent summary of 
adversarial attack. Hence, SSIM metric is to be used for the 
algorithm’s quality estimation. 
Let’s denote neural network attack problem statement. 
The output is presented as a probability distribution of 
handwritten digit classes 𝑧. Consider that the network 
predicts image as an instance of class 𝑆 ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,9} if 
𝑧𝑆 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1,𝐾
𝑧𝑘. By changing some pixels’ brightness, we 
want to change neural network prediction to 𝑇 ∈
{0,1,2, . . . ,9},  𝑇 ≠ 𝑆, i.e. ?̂?𝑇 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1,𝐾
?̂?𝑘, where 
?̂? =  𝜎((𝑥 +  𝛥𝑥) ⋅  𝑊 + 𝑏). Also we enforce image 
correctness by clamping brightness values into a range 
𝑥𝑖 ∈  [0,1],  𝑖 = 1,784.  
Single algorithm step pseudocode: 
attack_step (image, source_weights, target_weights, 
𝛼 ∈ {0; 0.5; 1}, 𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 > 0, 
𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 > 0) 
 for each point i in the image  
find corresponding weights 𝑊𝑆 and 𝑊𝑇in weight 
matrices for source S and target T classes 
 let 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 = 𝛼𝑊𝑇 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑆 
 if  |𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎| > 𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, then 
 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 ⋅ 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 
 if 𝑥 < 0, then 𝑥 = 0 
 if 𝑥 > 0, then 𝑥 = 1. 
Where image is an image obtained on the previous 
algorithm step or the source one if this is the first algorithm 
step; source_weights is the trained network weight matrix 
for original image label; target_weights is the trained 
Figure 1 – Image pixel weights for each dataset digit 
Figure 2 – Pixel importance difference for 
classes of 9 and 4 
network weight matrix for a class, towards which we want 
to change the prediction; min_difference is the minimal 
difference between classes’ weight matrices for a pixel to 
be an attack target; step signifies pixel brightness change 
on the current iteration; 𝛼 ∈ {0; 0.5; 1} defines the 
algorithm modification, the algorithm step is repeated 
max_steps times. Recommended values for the described 
parameter values are to follow. 
As it was remarked above, by the constraints on the 
target class 𝑗, adversarial attacks are divided into two 
subtypes: 
– if the goal is to assign to an image a specific class 𝑗 
instead of class 𝑘, then such an attack is called targeted. 
This type of attack can be accomplished via the described 
algorithm with 𝛼 = 0.5 or 𝛼 = 1. With that, it is said that 
the algorithm has succeeded to attack an image only if the 
algorithm has been able to change neural network’s 
predicted class into digit 𝑗 in a finite number of steps, and 
has failed in all other cases; 
– if the goal is to reassign classification of an image of 
a class 𝑘, to any different one 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, then the attack is 
called non-targeted. The algorithm parameter 𝛼 = 0 can be 
used to perform such an attack. The result is a success if an 
incorrect classification has been achieved in a finite 
number of steps. 
 
4 EXPERIMENTS 
 
Here we will present several of most interesting attack 
cases. 7 → 2 is the first attack to be performed with a goal 
to force a neural network to misclassify 7 as 2. Adversarial 
attack results are shown on fig. 3. Algorithm parameters: 
𝛼 = 0.5, min_difference = 0.0, step = 0.02, 
max_steps=10. The image with perturbations that were 
enough to trick the network into thinking that it has been 
presented a “2” digit is highlighted in green. As the image 
appears to be visually indistinct from the source (which is 
confirmed by a high SSIM metric of 0.931), the image 
difference has been visualized below, where white regions 
mean that no changes have been applied in that point, red 
regions signify source image brightness increase, the blues 
mean brightness decrease. 
It should be considered, that if all image pixels are 
being attacked by bearing in mind only the sign of the 
attack difference (as it is done in [6]), then the attack will 
still be successful. However, in such a case image noise can 
be viewed easily. A generic comparison with fast 
adversarial attack methods will be presented in a later 
section of the paper. 
Let’s visualize influence of min_difference attack 
parameter onto the attack result. The algorithm step has 
been increased for the effect to be more pronounced. In our 
case 99% of pixel weights lie in range [−1;1], so the 
difference by modulo is within [0;2], that’s the range for 
the min_difference parameter. Fig. 4 has the results of 
targeted attack 7→2 displayed with algorithm parameters: 
𝛼 = 0.5, min_difference = 0.65, step = 0.25, 
max_steps = 10. As it turns out, it has been enough to 
modify pixel brightness of only 3 source image points for 
the attack to succeed. SSIM value of 0.926 has been 
achieved. Experiments akin to this one have been 
performed on a set of images and all with a success. 
However, it has been noted, that an algorithm has an 
Figure 3 – 7→2 attack with low min_difference. Algorithm parameters: 𝛼 = 0.5, min_difference = 0.0, step = 0.02, 
max_steps = 10 
Figure 4 – 7→2 attack with high min_difference. Algorithm parameters: 𝛼 = 0.5, min_difference = 0.65, step = 0.25, 
max_steps = 10 
interesting feature, where in some cases it leads the attack 
not directly to the target class, but through some 
intermediate class instead. 
For example, for the targeted attack 6 into 1 during the 
first algorithm steps we have 6 misclassified as 2. In a case 
when such an intermediate class appears during the attack, 
perceptual image quality is degraded (for this example we 
got SSIM = 0.635). 
The problem’s roots have been investigated by utilizing 
PCA (Principal Component Analysis). After having 
visualized scatted plot for points of classes 2, 6 and 1 it has 
been noticed, that intercluster distance for digits 2 and 6 is 
a lot lower that the distance for 6 and 1. And as is shown 
on fig. 6 (for α=0.5), the difference vector between the 
target and source classes passes through the field of twos. 
For targeted attack such issues can be avoided by using 
another algorithm modification with parameter 𝛼 = 1. 
Thus, by applying such a modification for the targeted 
attack we will strive to maximize output of the target 
neuron when compared to others. We can minimize source 
neuron output in respect to the other ones to accomplish 
non-targeted attack using an additional algorithm 
modification with 𝛼 = 0. 
Much better modified image quality can be obtained by 
the virtue of such algorithm modifications (for example, 
for the same 6→1 attack SSIM score has risen to 0.780). 
Fig. 5 has trajectories of the source image 6 while being a 
subject to modification by the original algorithm and both 
its variations (targeted and non-targeted). 
 
 
5 RESULTS 
 
So far, we have presented two images for an attack: one 
has needed almost no changes for the attack to succeed, 
another has visible changes introduced to be misclassified 
yet it is still correctly recognized by the human observers. 
In order to compare our algorithm against other fast 
adversarial attack algorithm we need to perform a 
generalized attack analysis. By launching targeted attack 
for each pair of source and target classes, a success rate 
heatmap has been drawn (fig. 6a). Source classes are 
shown on the left, the target classes in the bottom. 
Figure 5 – 6→1 attack trajectory as projected onto a surface using PCA: targeted attack with 𝛼 = 0.5 (orange), 
targeted with 𝛼 = 1 (purple), non-targeted with 𝛼 = 0 (red) 
Figure 6 – SSIM metric values heatmap for each source, target attack pair: a) with fixed adversarial attack scoping; b) with 
automatically selected adversarial attack scoping. 
a) b) 
Heatmap elements are SSIM values averaged across all 
the attacks for a given source, target pair. Mean quality 
over the whole test dataset is 0.76 – such images after 
attack will still be correctly classified by a human. Top 
score has been achieved for an attack of similar digits i.e. 
8→9, 9→8, 0→8, 3→8. The highest quality degradation was 
for attack 1→0. This can be explained by the fact that the 
vital region for zero is a black hole in the middle, which 
gets usually overlapped by a white bar of a one digit. 
Should be noted, that 0→1 attack requires much fewer 
image modifications then the one in opposite direction, 
which is proved by comparing SSIM value (higher by 
0.21). As attacks have been built on real test set samples 
opposed to the generic digit silhouettes which got learnt by 
the neural network, the heatmap SSIM values lack 
symmetry. Lower average image quality loss can be 
attained by employing a stricter parameter selection 
algorithm. While fig. 6 has losses computed for a low 
empirically chosen min_difference=0.5 value, by selecting 
the best value from range [0.0, 1.0] an increase of SSIM to 
0.87 score has been observed (fig. 6b). A higher average 
SSIM score 0.93 has been reached for the non-targeted 
attack case, which means that source and target images are 
nearly impossible to distinguish with a naked eye. As 
previously, digits 0, 8 were the easiest ones to attack, a 
class of ones has proved to be the most problematic (fig. 7).  
 
 
If image quality loss deviation is high for different 
images of a certain class (i.e. some images are easy to 
attack, while others not), then algorithm is inefficient (as it 
can only change digits that look similar to several classes); 
if, conversely, the deviation is small, then the algorithm is 
efficient. So, by checking our targeted attack box-plot 
against the above-described thought we have come to a 
conclusion, that our algorithm is efficient at attacking 
different classes. 
SSIM plots, with respect to min_difference parameter 
value, have allowed to make a conclusion about the fact 
that each class has a tendency of an image quality rise 
jointly with min_difference increase up to 0.9 point, such a 
trend is especially noticeable for the class of nines (fig. 8).  
Specifically, the human perceived image quality loss 
will be substantially lower in case of a strong change of 
several pixels, then when all image points are slightly 
modified. Taking this feature into account is the thing that 
makes our algorithm standout among all other known 
methods in the literature. 
Among the fast gradient methods, the most efficient 
algorithm is I-FGM with L2 norm loss [7]. An attack for 
each source, target pair has been conducted by following 
the above described procedure for the case without 
min_difference selection. Algorithm has been successful 
on all test images, but has achieved a lower SSIM score of 
0.83. 
Next, the question of adversarial image transfer has 
been considered. We want to perform the so-called black 
box attack, when we don’t have any knowledge about 
network’s weights or architecture, the only allowed 
operation is to query neural network prediction engine by 
submitting images to it. The attack will be performed by 
using the above described logistic regression architecture, 
then an attempt to transfer each image to a 5-layer 
unknown neural network will be made. 
For the results reproducibility neural network 
architecture is to follow, yet this knowledge has not been 
used in any way during the attack phase. The neural 
network has a 5-layer fully-connected architecture with 
layer sizes of 200, 100, 60, 30, i.e. 4 hidden, one output 
with 10 neurons and one input with 784. As a mean of 
regularizing the network Batch Normalization has been 
applied after the first layer, Dropout after the second one. 
ReLU has been used as an activation function for all layers 
but the last one, where we have switched to a Softmax 
function instead. After 100 epochs of training using Adam 
optimization algorithm, training set accuracy has reached 
98.65%, the test one 98.51%. 
By the above-described procedure an average 
probability of 33% successfully transferred images has 
been achieved. Interesting to note, that in many cases 
images that were difficult to attack for the original network 
have seen a higher transfer rates than the ones needed only 
minor image changes. For instance, it has been possible to 
successfully transfer 87% of 1→0 attack images, which 
have been one of the most challenging ones, but only 14% 
9→7 attack images. 
Let’s follow along the 0→8 attack procedure. Each step 
will have the predicted digit with its probability shown for 
the attacked single-layer classifier (SL) and 5-layer fully-
connected network (FC5) (fig. 9). It should be observed 
that after there were enough changes to cheat the original 
network, it has been necessary to make 4 more steps to 
deceive the 5-layer one. This means that while the two 
networks have a similar decision boundary yet each one 
has it biased with respect to another one. Funnily, the 
changes introduced resemble a doorbell with a bowknot, 
no similarity with a sample of eight is observed. 
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Figure 8 – Increase of SSIM score when attack scope 
becomes smaller. The scope that is too small makes the 
attack impossible. 
Figure 7 – Low non-targeted attack SSIM score deviation. 
Algorithm is good at attacking different images of each 
class. 
Considering the above-described thoughts, a 
generalized targeted attack with neural network transfer 
has been conducted once again. This way, after having 
performed a successful attack on the source network, 4 
more algorithm steps are made. After that target network is 
queried only once for each min_difference value in a range 
[0.0,1.2] with step 0.1, this procedure yields 12 images for 
each min_difference, the best one of which is selected 
based on target (transfer) network score. This complication 
is done to minimize transferred network call count as the 
access to the network can be slow or partially restricted. 
This procedure makes it possible to transfer 91% of 
adversarial images with a minimal image quality loss. 
Furthermore, for most of source, target class pairs the 
attack transfer has been successfully performed for 100% 
images, except for the class of sixes. 
Having performed a successful black-box attack using 
adversarial image transfer from a single-layer network to a 
vastly different 5-layer network, it has been decided to try 
to tackle a real-world attack scenario. As has been 
mentioned above neural networks are getting traction in the 
domain of robotics, CCTV systems and autonomous 
vehicles, this is where adversarial attacks are the most 
dangerous. However, in such cases it might be hard to 
perform a “man-in-the-middle” type of attack, where an 
attacker can get into the stream between a camera and 
corresponding processing system, so we need to make 
adversarial image sustain artefacts and noise introduced by 
the camera. 
For the experiment we are going to use digits that are 
written on a white paper with a black pen, shots are to be 
taken with an ordinary smartphone camera. In order to 
make a guarantee of digits being correctly classified by the 
neural network, we need to perform the same conversion 
steps as done on the images of the MNIST dataset. Namely, 
we need to 1) convert color image into grayscale; 2) 
compute a center-of-mass of the pixels for a given digit and 
crop around that region a 28𝑥28 box; 3) invert colors: as 
we need to have a black background and white ink. Thus, 
a set of recognitions has been performed, the network has 
been successful at recognizing digits written under various 
angles and by different people. 
Next, we need to perform an attack. To restrict 
perturbations done to the image let’s assume that writing 
with a pen is the only allowed operation, no parts of a digit 
can be erased. Also, as it has been mentioned previously, 
targeted attack case is more challenging than untargeted, so 
we will focus only on a targeted attack. Given the above-
described constraints, an algorithm constructing binary 
importance map has been implemented. With a minimum 
value of 𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.0, generally the shape of 
the digit is well visible (fig. 10a). However, by scoping 
importance region with a value of 𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
0.3, clouds of dots with high network weight or high 
importance start appearing (fig. 10b). 
With that a set of attacks has been performed. Next a 
few examples selected at random are presented. In a case 
Figure 9 – 0→8 transfer attack. Images are transferred to a fully-connected 5-layer network. Algorithm parameters:  
𝛼 = 1.0, min_difference = 0.2, step = 0.4, max_steps = 10 
a) 
b) 
Figure 10 – An example of the generated importance map. 
a) 𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.0; b) 𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.3 
of 4 → 9 attack, initially we had 4 recognized with a 
probability of 80%, after underlining the digit we get 9 with 
confidence 42% (highest confidence for the given image), 
as shown on fig. 11a. 0 → 5 attack has been performed by 
adding a quote in the top-right corner (fig 11b). 
Interestingly, while 0 was recognized with 80% 
confidence, 5 has a confidence of 100%. Lastly, two 
attacks on 9 are shown: 9 → 6 by drawing a white blob 
near the digit, 9 → 5 by writing a comma (fig. 11c). In all 
the cases an attack region to be drawn with a pen has been 
selected by consulting the binary importance map. It is 
important to note, that generally it has been possible to 
perform the attack outside a digit’s bounding box, thus the 
shape is easily recognized by the human, additionally, no 
distracting noise has been added to the image. However, 
the question arises whether any random perturbation can 
full the network. This question has already been answered 
in [3] for adversarial images fed into the network directly, 
where the answer was negative – only for a small set of 
images it has been possible to change assigned class by the 
neural network. Does the same holds for a physical-world 
type of attack? It does. For example, digit 3 with an 
extended line is similar to 5 for a human, so it is for a neural 
network (fig. 11d), adding comma to a digit 2 has not 
helped it to be recognized as 5 (fig. 11e) as in the case of 
9 → 5 attack. 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
 
A neural-network adversarial attack algorithm based on a 
scoping idea has been presented, with interesting features 
such as an ability to draw binary importance map with 
region highlighting for a targeted attack for a specific class, 
which allows for the first time to perform a MNIST 
handwritten digit dataset attack using an ordinary pen or 
pencil. By varying area of the attack using the introduced 
min_difference parameter it has become possible to 
improve effectiveness (in terms of minimizing structural 
image similarity loss during the attack) of existing fast 
gradient-based adversarial attack methods and to perform 
a successful adversarial attack transfer with minimum 
number of transferred network calls, thus enabling efficient 
attacks against yet unknown systems. 
The presented adversarial attack analysis scheme will ease 
early neural-network-based systems’ security diagnostics 
and will boost further research in the direction of better 
understanding of inner workings of neural network’s inner 
inference mechanisms. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Three fast adversarial attack algorithm modifications 
for logistic regression have been presented in the paper: 
two for performing targeted and one for non-targeted 
attack. It has been shown that by scoping adversarial attack 
it is possible to lower quality loss during the attack when 
compared to other fast gradient-based adversarial attack 
algorithms and to generate binary adversarial maps for 
further efficient attack transfer into real world using pen or 
pencil. The relevance of the work is explained by a 
growing use of neural networks in security critical areas 
without prior analysis of the neural network’s durability 
against attacks. 
The scientific novelty of obtained results is that for the 
first time adversarial attack algorithm has been built upon 
the attack scoping idea. The presented algorithm can 
automatically select region size for adversarial attack thus 
yielding images that have fewer structural changes than 
other gradient-based algorithms. Adversarial attack 
scoping has an interesting feature of improving adversarial 
attack transfer across networks of different architectures 
and into the real world. 
The practical significance of the obtained results is that 
an early neural network vulnerability diagnostic can be 
performed by utilizing the proposed algorithms and image 
quality loss analysis system, which is a pivotal point 
towards a safer practical neural network use. 
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